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Abstract
We study the wage-setting problem of an employer with private information about
demand for its product when workers can engage in costly on-the-job search. Employers
understand that low wage offers may convey bad news that induces workers to search.
The unique perfect sequential equilibrium wage strategy is characterized by: (i) pooling
by intermediate-revenue employers on a common wage that just deters search; (ii)
discontinuously lower revealing offers by low-revenue employers for whom the benefit
of deterring search fails to warrant the required high pooling wage; and (iii) high
revealing offers by high-revenue employers seeking to deter aggressive raiders.
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1 Introduction
Consider a company that experiences a large negative demand shock for its product. If
its production entails the use of an input such as widgets, the company may want to open
its books to its widget supplier to reveal this information. Even though opening its books is
costly, revealing the bad news to its widget supplier may allow it to negotiate a lower price
for its widgets that more than offsets those costs.
Employees are also inputs to production—but workers are not widgets. Revealing bad
news may give workers incentives to search for new jobs, increasing the risk that the com-
pany loses valued employees who have acquired valuable skills. That is, a worker who learns
that her company is in trouble may initiate costly on-the-job search to try to find a more
secure job. If the worker leaves, the company’s hardship will be exacerbated. To forestall
such search, a company may work to conceal bad news from its workers, understanding that
workers may search, but widgets do not.
This paper studies how the wage that an employer offers its workers varies with its
information about demand for its product in such scenarios. We consider an employer that
privately observes the market conditions underlying the revenues that a worker would gen-
erate. When the employer makes its wage offer, it considers the consequences for a worker’s
actions and probabilities of retention. In our simple framework, a worker’s search motive is
driven by a fear that her employer may be facing weak demand, and thus likely to shut down,
leaving her unemployed. Because a worker only sees the wage offer and not the underlying
market conditions, she uses the information contained in the wage offer to decide whether to
engage in costly on-the-job search that improves the likelihood of drawing an outside offer.
We identify and exhaustively characterize the unique perfect sequential equilibrium.
A worker’s search decision depends on her employer’s perceived viability: Bad news por-
tending shutdown increases the value of soliciting outside offers, while good news reduces the
value of such effort. An employer’s equilibrium wage offer reflects an understanding of such
considerations by its workers: In normal times—when expected revenues are neither very low
nor very high—the employer chooses a common wage that does not vary with its expected
revenues. This common wage is just high enough that it is only justifiable for an employer
in reasonable health, just convincing the worker that times are not so bad that search is
warranted. When times are tougher, setting this common wage to deter search ceases to
be justifiable. Instead, an employer expecting low revenues opts for a discontinuously lower
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wage, understanding that the worker will search for outside offers upon observing the wage.
When times are sufficiently good, by contrast, the employer offers more than the common
wage to signal the good news and to reduce the risk of losing the worker who, despite not
searching, may still be hired away by an aggressive outside firm.
Qualitatively, the keys for this characterization are only that (i) wage offers convey in-
formation about market conditions to workers; and (ii) higher wage offers raise the likelihood
of retaining a worker. Thus, the results extend to alternative formulations of wage compe-
tition between the employer and raiding firms. For example, successful search may result
in the worker being able to draw a wage from an exogenous distribution, or an employer
may be able to sometimes, but not always, enter a bidding war and make a counter-offer
in what becomes a second-price auction. The qualitative implications for wage setting ex-
tend beyond search to settings in which workers may take other actions that employers care
about, provided that good news encourages the preferred action and employers with good
news gain more from this action. For example, our analysis can characterize wage offers
when a worker must decide whether to make a human capital investment in the presence of
production complementarities between privately-observed demand and the investment.
The informational asymmetry between employers and workers has direct implications for
job loss among workers. For employers that set the common wage but expect relatively low
revenues, doing so serves to shroud unfavorable information about future viability, distorting
their workers’ search decisions: Upon observing the common wage, these workers incorrectly
infer that their employers are likely in better health than they actually are, and hence do not
search. Had the workers known the truth—had there been no informational asymmetry—
they would have searched in order to insulate themselves from job loss. The result is avoidable
job loss among workers for those employers that end up shuttering their doors.
The premise that employers have private information about demand, and thus the like-
lihood of shutdown, is motivated by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
(WARN) laws in the United States. The WARN Act of 1988 requires employers to provide
workers with two-months advance notice of anticipated plant closings and mass layoffs.1 Per
the Department of Labor, advance notice is intended to:
“...give workers and their families some transition time to adjust to the prospec-
tive loss of employment, to seek and obtain other jobs...”
1WARN laws apply to employers with over 100 employees, excluding those who have worked fewer than
six of the last 12 months and those who average fewer than 20 hours of work per week.
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Such laws represent prima facie evidence of the informational structure and mechanism
that we study—that employers have private information about their future viability and, in
the absence of legislation mandating disclosure, will choose to withhold such information,
thereby exposing their workers to avoidable job loss. That such disclosure laws are costly to
employers (Clinebell and Clinebell (1994)) adds empirical weight to this argument.
The role of wages in mediating this informational asymmetry is motivated by an em-
pirical literature documenting evidence that wages change relatively infrequently. While our
framework is static, the pooling of wages across types that arises in equilibrium lends itself
naturally to a dynamic interpretation: In a dynamic setting, following a change in market
conditions, firms choose between pooling on a wage—typically the existing wage—versus in-
creasing or decreasing the wage. In our static setting, we endogenize the pooling wage via our
equilibrium refinement. While a fully dynamic model is beyond our paper’s scope, our static
notion of pooling naturally translates to a dynamic notion of “wage rigidity.” Separately,
our model is motivated by an empirical literature documenting cross-sectional evidence that,
within firms, there is little variation in pay between different workers in similar jobs, and a
more recent literature that exploits confidential administrative data to show that earnings
growth distributions are negatively skewed and exhibit substantial kurtosis—all observations
that our mechanism could plausibly help to explain.
Theoretically, our model is related to efficiency wage models, especially those with labor
turnover motives (e.g., Stiglitz (1985)). A key difference is the form of informational asymme-
try: In efficiency-wage models, wage-setting decisions reflect that a worker’s action is private
information to the worker and thus non-contractible, motivating a role for wages to influence
worker behavior. Here, by contrast, wage-setting decisions reflect that employers have private
information, motivating a role for wages to convey information to workers and affect search
decisions. Our model is also related to Weingarden (2017), who studies employment decisions
of firms in an asymmetric information setting in which firms seek to induce worker effort.
2 Model
We study a one-period game between a risk-neutral worker and employer. The employer
sees the market conditions that underlie the revenues a worker would generate and makes a
wage offer. The worker only sees the wage offer and not the market conditions. Given the
wage offer, the worker decides whether to engage in costly on-the-job search.
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At the outset, the employer observes a signal y ∈ [y, y¯] ≡ Y equal to the expected rev-
enues that the worker will generate if she stays and the employer remains viable. We assume
that y is drawn from a commonly-known distribution HI that is twice continuously differen-
tiable with density hI . This revenue signal also contains information about the employer’s
future viability: with probability g(y) the employer remains viable, but with probability
1 − g(y) the employer will shut down, lay off the worker and earn zero profits. We assume
that g′(y) > 0: employers expecting higher revenues are more likely to be viable. After
observing y, but prior to the shut-down shock, the employer makes a wage offer w ≥ w
that the worker would receive were she to stay with her employer who remains viable, where
w ≤ y is a wage floor.2 A laid-off worker who fails to find employment elsewhere receives
unemployment benefit b, where w > b. It eases presentation to assume that y = w.
The worker does not see y, but the employer’s wage offer w conveys information about
y. Given w, the worker decides whether to engage in costly on-the-job search. Search en-
tails a fixed cost κ > 0, but improves the worker’s likelihood of drawing an outside offer: a
searching worker encounters a raiding firm with probability α ∈ (0, 1], while a non-searching
worker does so with lower probability β ∈ (0, α). Here, β > 0 captures the two-sided nature
of search—Faberman et al. (2017) find that employed job seekers receive high numbers of
both solicited and unsolicited job offers, indicating that outside firms often initiate searches
by directly contacting workers at other employers. We assume that the revenues the worker
would generate at the raider are drawn independently from a distribution HP with non-
increasing density hP on [y, y¯] that could differ from HI . The raider observes the employer’s
wage offer (and whether it survived) before making its wage offer. We also assume that
the layoff risk is high enough that a worker would want to search were she to observe the
lowest revenue signal y: (1 − g(y))(w − b)(α − β) > κ. These assumptions imply a strictly
positive employment rent for the worker, i.e., for avoiding unemployment, giving rise to a
precautionary motive for on-the-job search.
To ease analysis, the model is designed so the sole reason for search is this precautionary
motive. To see this, note that if an incumbent employer survives, a worker who receives an
outside offer joins the raider if and only if it offers a wage w′ ≥ w. If the employer shuts
down, the worker joins the raiding firm if and only if it offers a feasible wage w′ ≥ w. Thus,
if the incumbent employer survives, a raider with y′ > w will hire the worker at wage w′ = w,
while a raiding firm with y′ ≤ w will either not make an offer, or will offer w′ < w, and have
2Employers with y < w can never earn profits by retaining workers.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
its offer rejected. If the incumbent shuts down, a raider hires the worker at w′ = w > b.
The model highlights the twin roles played by wage offers: (i) they convey information
to workers about market conditions faced by employers, and hence the value of search; and
(ii) when raiders seek to hire workers, higher wage offers increase the likelihood that employ-
ers retain workers. Our qualitative findings generalize when these features are preserved.
Appendix C illustrates this for a more general notion of outside wage competition.
Complete information benchmark. As a prelude, we characterize equilibrium outcomes
when a worker sees y before making search decisions. The employer’s strategy is a wage offer
function ω¯(y) that maps each value of y into a wage offer w. Abusing notation slightly, the
worker’s strategy is a function σ¯(w, y) mapping each (w, y) pair into a search intensity {α, β},
corresponding to the probability of receiving a wage offer from a raider. An equilibrium is
a pair σ¯∗(w, y) and ω¯∗(y) such that:
1. The worker searches, i.e. σ¯∗(w, y) = α, if and only if
E
[
(1−g(y))
(
(1−α)b+αw
)
+g(y)w−κ∣∣w, y] > E[(1−g(y))((1−β)b+βw)+g(y)w∣∣w, y]
(1)
2. The wage offer ω¯∗(y) maximizes expected profits given σ¯∗(w, y), solving
max
w≥w
{
g(y)(y − w)[1− σ¯∗(w, y)(1−HP (w))]
}
. (2)
The definition of equilibrium subsumes the formalization of optimization by a raiding
firm and a worker’s choice of where to work, detailed above.
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If a worker observes y, her optimization problem is simple. Low values of y imply a
high probability of job loss, and thus a high precautionary value of on-the-job search. The
solution to (1) implies that the worker’s search decision is characterized by a cutoff y∗ such
that the worker searches if and only if y < y∗, where y∗ solves g(y∗) = 1− κ
(α−β)(w−b) . That
is, the search decision only depends on y (save at y∗), and not the wage w, so we can abuse
notation and write it as σ¯∗(y) = α if y < y∗ and σ¯∗(y) = β if y > y∗.
The employer’s optimization problem is also simple. Expected employer profits are
strictly concave in w. Thus, when interior, the employer’s wage offer is given implicitly by
the unique solution w(y, σ¯∗(y)) to the first-order condition for (2),
(y − w)σ¯∗(y)hP (w)− [1− σ¯∗(y)(1−HP (w))] = 0, (3)
and it equals w otherwise. That is, the employer’s equilibrium wage offer is given by
ω¯∗(y) = w for y < yˆ(σ¯∗(y)), and ω¯∗(y) = w(y, σ¯∗(y)) for y ≥ yˆ(σ¯∗(y)), where yˆ(σ¯∗(y)) solves
(yˆ − w)(1− σ¯∗(yˆ)) = (yˆ − w(yˆ, σ¯∗(yˆ)))(1− σ¯∗(yˆ)(1−HP (w(yˆ, σ¯∗(yˆ))))).
Inspection of (3) reveals that, fixing σ¯∗(y), the marginal payoffs of higher wages rise with y,
reflecting that employers with better prospects lose more if workers leave. So, too, fixing y,
the marginal payoffs of higher wages rise with the probability that workers receive outside
offers.
When expected revenues from retaining workers are very low, employers offers the low-
est feasible wage that will retain workers who fail to receive an outside wage offer. When
expected revenues are high enough, an employer competes by offering a higher wage that
trades off the reduced profits when the worker is retained against the increased likelihood of
retaining a worker who encounters a raider.3
Incomplete Information. We next characterize equilibrium outcomes when workers do
not see y prior to deciding whether to search. In this environment, workers make inferences
about y, and hence the likelihood of layoff 1− g(y), based on the wage offers they receive.
The employer’s strategy is a function ω(y) mapping each y into a wage offer w. The
worker’s strategy is a function σ(w) mapping each wage offer w into a search intensity {α, β}.
A worker belief function is a function mapping each feasible wage offer w into a probability
3We assume that y¯ > yˆ(β), i.e., the risk that an employer fails can be sufficiently low relative to the cost
κ of search that workers do not search.
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distribution µ(y|w) over y.
Definition. A pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a pair of strategies, σ∗(w)
and ω∗(y), and a worker belief function µ(y|w) such that:
1. The worker engages in costly search, i.e. σ∗(w) = α, if
Eµ
[
(1−g(y))
(
(1−α)b+αw
)
+g(y)w−κ∣∣w] > Eµ[(1−g(y))((1−β)b+βw)+g(y)w∣∣w],
(4)
but not if the inequality is reversed.
2. The employer’s wage offer ω∗(y) maximizes expected profits given σ∗(w), solving
max
w≥w
{
g(y)(y − w)(1− σ∗(w)(1−HP (w))
}
. (5)
3. For all possible equilibrium-path wages (i.e. ∀w ∈ {w|∃y ∈ Y with ω∗(y) = w}), beliefs
µ(y|w) are updated via Bayes’ rule.
Definition. A pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE) is any pure-strategy PBE
for which beliefs following out-of-equilibrium wage offers satisfy the credibility condition:
For all wages not occurring in equilibrium (i.e. ∀w˜ 6∈ {w|∃y ∈ Y with ω∗(y) = w}),
there does not exist a corresponding set of revenue types J(w˜) such that
E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))] < min
σ˜∈BR(J(w˜),w˜)
{
E[pi(y, w˜, σ˜)]
}
⇐⇒ y ∈ J(w˜). (6)
We focus on pure-strategy PSE, i.e., equilibria that satisfy the credibility condition of
Grossman and Perry (1986). After characterizing PSE, we describe the properties possessed
by all PBE. Appendix A exhaustively characterizes all PBE.
Workers search when the offered wage indicates a sufficiently high probability of job
loss. A worker’s search decision is again characterized by a cutoff rule, but now the cut-
off rule reflects a worker’s beliefs about g(y) following the wage offer w: σ∗(w) = α if
Eµ[g(y)|w] < g(y∗), and σ∗(w) = β if Eµ[g(y)|w] > g(y∗).
An employer’s optimization problem reflects the dual role played by wage offers: wage
offers directly affect the likelihood of retaining a worker and they convey information about
market conditions, potentially affecting search decisions. Proposition 1 establishes that the
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equilibrium is unique given a restriction to credible beliefs.4,5
Proposition 1. There is an essentially unique PSE wage strategy ω∗(·). The strategy is
characterized by:
W1 A unique pooling wage, wp, given by w if Eµ[g(y)|w] > g(y∗), and otherwise solv-
ing Eµ[g(y)|wp] = g(y∗). The pooling region Y p is bounded from below by y if E[pi(y, wp, β)] >
E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)], and otherwise by the y solving E[pi(y, wp, β)] = E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)].
It is bounded from above by y¯ if y¯ < ω¯∗−1(wp, β), and otherwise by ω¯∗−1(wp, β).
When y is sufficiently low (i.e., y < inf{y|E[pi(y, wp, β)] = E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)]}) and y¯ is
sufficiently high (i.e., y¯ > ω¯∗−1(wp, β)), then:
W2 Lower types y < inf{Y p} offer low revealing (complete-information) wages that lead
their workers to search.
W3 Type y = inf{Y p} is indifferent between setting wp and the discontinuously lower
complete-information wage that induces search.
W4 Types y ∈ Y p pool on a wage just high enough to deter search: Eµ[g(y)|wp] = g(y∗).
W5 Higher types y > max{Y p} offer high revealing (complete-information) wages that
strictly discourage search.
W6 wp is the complete-information wage of the highest pooling type.
Proof. See Appendix B.
That employers anticipating intermediate revenues pool on a common wage and thus
conceal their private information reflects the informational role of wage offers. Employers
receiving positive signals about revenues place greater value on the employment relation-
ship, benefiting more from retaining employees. As a result, ω∗(·) weakly increases with an
employer’s expected revenue. Therefore, higher wage offers signal higher expected revenues,
reducing a worker’s incentive to search. It follows that, among employers for whom revealing
induces search, those expecting relatively high revenues offer a high wage—above what they
would offer absent informational asymmetries—to emulate a higher type whose worker would
prefer not to search. Pooling thus emerges in any PSE.
4The set of PSE is unique up to indifference by the revenue type who either reveals and induces search
or pools and deters search.
5We let ω¯∗(y, σ) denote the optimal complete-information wage for fixed search decision σ. To ease
notation, we write ω¯∗−1(w, σ) = max{y|ω¯∗(y, σ) = w}.
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Figure 2: Incomplete information (unique PSE)
w
y
w*
w
y*
(y)
Yp
Search (Ys) No search (Yns)
wp
Notes: Uniform uncertainty with g(y) = y.
The precise structure and uniqueness of the pooling wage offer in W1 reflects the re-
quirement that workers’ beliefs be credible. To understand, observe that if employers pool
on some wage wp > w for which Eµ[g(y)|wp] > g(y∗), then there is a slightly lower wage,
wp − , that is preferred to wp by a coalition including (i) non-pooling types y < inf{Y p}
for whom wp −  would rationalize deviating from their low revealing wage in order to deter
search, and (ii) pooling types for whom wp −  is closer to their complete-information wage,
provided that such a deviation deters search. Because this coalition consists only of relatively
high types, such deviations must induce workers to believe Eµ[g(y)|wp− ] > g(y∗), to which
their unique best response is not to search. Thus, for any such wp > w, there always exists
a profitable deviation to wp −  when beliefs must be credible.
W2–W6 characterize the equilibrium wage structure ω∗(y) when the distribution of
revenue types has sufficient support. Figure 2 depicts the key qualitative features.
W2 establishes that as long as the prospects for some employers are sufficiently dire,
i.e., as long as y is sufficiently low, then some employers do not value the employment re-
lationship enough to justify paying the common pooling wage needed to deter search. Such
employers understand that lower wage offers will reveal that economic conditions are so bad
that workers should search; thus, they do best to offer their optimal complete-information
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wage. Employers expecting higher revenues value the employment relationship by more—the
opportunity cost of losing a worker is higher. W3 establishes that some employer is just in-
different between offering a low wage that reveals low expected revenues and induces search,
and offering the discontinuously higher pooling wage that induces beliefs that expected rev-
enues exceed what they in fact are, deterring search.
Employers with better outlooks than this indifferent type thus prefer to offer wages that
deter search. W4 establishes that the pooling wage leaves workers just indifferent between
searching and not: Eµ[g(y)|wp] = g(y∗). The sufficient support assumption ensures that
wp > w. Were a higher pooling wage offered such that Eµ[g(y)|wp] > g(y∗), then a coalition
of relatively high types would deviate to a wage slightly below wp, as described above. In
response, workers with credible beliefs would forego search knowing that only relatively high
types would consider such a deviation, so such wage strategies cannot be part of a PSE.
Employers with even better prospects whose complete-information wages exceed wp
know that such offers will signal high expected revenues and thus also deter search. For
such employers, pooling on wp requires making an uncompetitively low offer (given their
high valuations of workers) while conferring no benefits in terms of search behavior. Hence,
they offer their complete-information wages. As W5 details, provided y¯ is sufficiently high,
wages eventually rise smoothly from the pooling wage, reflecting that employers expecting
such high revenues want to offer a wage over and above the pooling wage to reduce the risk
of losing workers to raiding firms. Finally, W6 establishes that employers who deter search
offer the pooling wage if it weakly exceeds the wage they would offer if they could ensure
that a worker would not search.
The equilibrium structure of wages described above speaks to several well-documented
empirical features of wage distributions. First, a large literature documents that wages only
change infrequently, with downward revisions occurring particularly rarely (e.g. Altonji and
Devereux (2000), Gottschalk (2005), etc.). While our framework is static, our results nat-
urally admit a more dynamic interpretation: Instead of describing the firm’s decision of
whether or not to change the wage from some pre-existing level in response to changes in
market conditions, we provide a characterization of the (unique) wage on which firms pool
that arises endogenously in equilibrium. Allowing for repeated transitory shocks to a firm’s
expected revenue in our model delivers a dynamic notion of “wage rigidity” that bears di-
rectly on such evidence. Second, a distinct literature documents cross-sectional evidence of
intra-firm wage compression. Groshen (1991) documents that over 90% of wage variation is
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explained by occupation and establishment alone: In industries with relatively few incentive
workers, worker-level variation can explain only 3-7% of total variation in wages (see also
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)). This complementary evidence is consistent with the
characterization of wages that arises in our model. Third, a more recent empirical literature
(e.g. Karahan et al. (2017)) exploits confidential employer-employee matched administrative
panel data on earnings to establish that earnings growth distributions among job stayers are
negatively skewed and exhibit substantial kurtosis. In our model, the discontinuous drop
in wages among employers who cannot rationalize offering the pooling wage to deter search
suggests a mechanism that can help account for these observations.
Finally, the characterization of wages that arises from the informational asymmetry
in our model is not innocuous in terms of employment outcomes. Employers offering the
pooling wage for whom expected revenues are relatively low deter search by workers who
would have searched in the absence of informational asymmetries. Because search increases
the likelihood of obtaining outside offers, such workers fail to effectively insulate themselves
from job loss. The measure
(α− β)
[
HI(g(y
∗))−HI(inf{Y p(wp)})
]
> 0 (7)
of workers become unemployed due to the informational asymmetry.
Wage competition. The qualitative properties of the equilibrium extend when competi-
tion between incumbent and raider is enriched to capture additional real world features of
labor markets. For example, they extend when successful search yields a draw with positive
probability from some non-trivial wage offer distribution. Such a scenario would arise when
successful search yields contact with a single raider who either does not observe the em-
ployer’s offer, or does not know the worker’s valuation of her current job because the worker
cannot credibly reveal its non-pecuniary value. Even when an incumbent can sometimes
make a counter-offer and thus compete with potential raiders in the auction, the incentive to
set a wage above that required to deter search in order to preemptively outbid outside offers
is reduced but the underlying logic is unchanged. We establish this formally in Appendix C.
Such scenarios increase workers’ incentives to search given any wage and belief about
her employer due to the added benefit of increasing the probability of securing a higher
outside offer. An employer’s wage offer now affects search decisions via two distinct chan-
nels: the information channel emphasized in our model (through which a higher wage signals
better news, reducing search incentives), and a direct channel via its level (through which
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higher offers reduce the likelihood of dominating outside offers, likewise reducing search in-
centives). Because employers expecting higher revenues lose more when workers leave, such
considerations raise their incentives to deter search.6
Because both wage channels affect search in the same direction, incorporating such ad-
ditional features would result in higher equilibrium pooling wages, but would not otherwise
alter the model’s qualitative properties. Indeed, adding these two assumptions, one can drop
the precautionary motive for search and assume g(y) = 1 for all y.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria. When beliefs are not required to be credible following un-
expected wage offers, multiple equilibria emerge. Nonetheless, Appendix A shows that all
PBE possess many properties of the unique PSE: (a) wage offers weakly increase with y,
reflecting that the opportunity cost of losing workers rises with y; (b) employers expecting
low revenues offer low wages—equal to those made when demand is public information—
thereby revealing bad news and inducing search, reflecting that the employment relationship
is not sufficiently valuable to justify the higher wage needed to deter search; (c) employ-
ers expecting intermediate revenues pool on the lowest wage that deters search, as higher
search-deterring wages would entail over-bidding with no countervailing benefit in terms of
search behavior; and (d) employers expecting high revenues who reveal their types (except
possibly y¯) offer wages arbitrarily close to their complete-information optima—wages that
diverge non-trivially would induce emulation by similar types who would gain from offering
wages closer to their complete-information optimum (so the offer would not be revealing).
The multiplicity of PBE reflects two possibilities that are sustained only by incredible
beliefs. One possibility, depicted in Figure 3(a), is equilibria with pooling on wages above
the pooling wage in Proposition 1. Such equilibria result if pooling on otherwise preferred
lower wages would induce pessimistic worker beliefs and hence search. If workers can adopt
such pessimistic beliefs, pooling on the higher wage is sustained. But such pessimism is
not credible following small deviations from a high pooling wage: Only employers expecting
high revenue value the employment relationship enough to offer such wages. The second
possibility, depicted in Figure 3(b), is equilibria featuring multiple pooling regions at higher
wages. Such equilibria are sustained by a similar argument applied to employers expect-
ing higher revenue: Workers observing high off-path wages can adopt an incredible degree of
pessimism to credibly threaten to search, rendering deviations away from high pooling wages
unprofitable for high types. The result is a proliferation of PBE, each featuring (possibly
6A similar rationale emerges in the preemptive-wage setting of Scoones and Bernhardt (1998).
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Figure 3: Incomplete information (multiple PBE)
w
y
w*
wp
y*
(y)
Search (Ys) No search (Yns)
wp'
w
(a) High pooling wage
w
y
w*
wp
y*
(y)
Search (Ys) No search (Yns)
wp'
wp''
w
(b) Multiple pooling wages
Notes: Uniform uncertainty with g(y) = y.
many) connected segments of high-revenue type employers pooling on high wages that may
be above or below the wages they would optimally choose conditional on deterring search.
3 Conclusion
The observation at the heart of this paper—that when employers have private informa-
tion, wage offers convey news that affects workers’ decisions—is germane to many settings. So
long as workers are inclined to take the action preferred by their employers—be it abstaining
from on-the-job search, investing in firm-specific human capital, exerting extra effort, etc.—
when they believe their employer is in good health, and so long as that action is more valuable
to employers in better health, the qualitative structure of wage offers should obtain. In par-
ticular, equilibrium wages are characterized by: pooling by intermediate employer types on
a common wage that just encourages the worker to take the desired action; discretely lower
revealing offers by low-revenue employers for whom the value of the desired action does not
warrant the higher pooling wage needed to induce the action; and high revealing offers by
high-revenue employers for whom workers would happily take the desired action, so that other
considerations dictate wage offers. Such generality suggests that the mechanism we identify
has wide-ranging empirical relevance for wage-setting that merits further investigation.
13
4 Bibliography
Altonji, Joseph and Paul Devereux (2000). “The Extent and Consequences of Downward
Nominal Wage Rigidity”. Research in Labor Economics Vol. 19.
Baker, George, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom (1994). “The Internal Economics of
the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data”. Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 109,
No. 4.
Bernhardt, Dan and David Scoones (1998). “Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary
Human Capital Acquisition”. Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 16, No. 1.
Clinebell, Sharon and John Clinebell (1994). “The Effect of Advance Notice of Plant
Closings on Firm Value”. Journal of Management Vol. 20, Issue 3.
Faberman, Jason, Andreas Mueller, Aysegul Sahin and Giorgio Topa (2017). “Job Search
Behavior among the Employed and Non-Employed”. NBER Working Paper.
Gottschalk, Peter (2005). “Downward Nominal-Wage Flexibility: Real or Measurement
Error?”. Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 87, Issue 3.
Groshen, Erica (1991). “Sources of Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion: How Much Do Em-
ployers Matter?”. Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 106, No. 3
Grossman, Sanford and Motty Perry (1986). “Perfect Sequential Equilibrium”. Journal
of Economic Theory Vol. 39, Issue 1.
Karahan, Fatih, Serdar Ozkan and Jae Song (2017). “Sources of Inequality in Earnings
Growth Over the Life Cycle”. Working Paper.
Stiglitz, Joseph (1985). “Equilibrium Wage Distributions”. The Economic Journal Vol.
95, No. 379.
Weingarden, Alison (2017). “Employment Dynamics in a Signaling Model with Workers’
Incentives”. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2017-040
14
Appendix
To conserve notation, let r(w, σ) ≡ 1−σ(1−HP (w)) denote the probability that the employer
retains a worker given w and σ. Slightly abusing notation, let ω¯∗(y, α) and ω¯∗(y, β) denote
the complete-information optimal wage offers given search and no-search, respectively. Fi-
nally, let Y s ≡ {y|σ∗(ω∗(y)) = α} and Y ns ≡ {y|σ∗(ω∗(y)) = β} denote the set of y for
which the employer’s wage offer induces search and no-search, respectively.
A. Characterization of PBE
Propositions 2 and 3 characterize the set of pure-strategy PBE wage strategies.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium wage strategy ω∗(·) has the following properties:
W1 Wage offers are weakly increasing in revenues: If y < y′, then ω∗(y) ≤ ω∗(y′).
W2 If a wage offer induces a worker to search, then it equals the complete information
wage: If y ∈ Y s, then ω∗(y) = ω¯∗(y).
W3 Only low revenue employers make wage offers that induce workers to search: If
y ∈ Y s and y′ ∈ Y ns, then y′ > y.
W4 Employers expecting sufficiently high revenues make wage offers that discourage
search: Y ns is non-empty.
W5 Employer profits, E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))], are continuous in y.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium wage offers that deter search have the following properties:
W6 The set of revenue types that offer a pooling wage that deters search is connected:
If y < y′ ∈ Y ns and ω∗(y′) = ω∗(y), then ω∗(y′′) = ω∗(y), ∀ y′′ ∈ (y, y′).
W7 If ω∗(y) discourages search and is not part of a pooling wage offer, i.e. if @ y′ such
that ω∗(y′) = ω∗(y), then either it is arbitrarily close to the complete information wage,
i.e., for all  > 0, |ω∗(y)− ω¯∗(y)| < , or the employer is the highest revenue type y¯.
W8 If Y s and Y ns are non-empty, then wages jump at the highest y for which the worker
searches: ω∗(y) is discontinuous upward at sup{Y s}.
15
W9 There is pooling at the lowest wage that deters search: ∃y′ > inf{Y ns} such that
∀y ∈ (inf{Y ns}, y′), ω∗(y) = wp. Furthermore, y′ ≥ min{y¯, sup{y|ω¯∗(y, β) = wp}}.
W10 If E[g(y)] < g(y∗), then Y s is non-empty.
Proof. We consider Propositions 2 and 3 together.
W1 If y < y′, then ω∗(y) ≤ ω∗(y′).
If the search decision is the same after ω∗(y) as ω∗(y′) then it follows immediately that
ω∗(y) ≤ ω∗(y′) because for a given probability σ of an outside offer, ∂2E[pi(y,w,σ)]/g(y)
∂y∂w
=
σhp(w) > 0, for w > y. Moreover, the optimal complete information wage increases in the
probability that the worker gets an outside offer, precluding ω∗(y) > ω∗(y′) for y ∈ Y ns,
y′ ∈ Y s. It remains to rule out w ≡ ω∗(y) > ω∗(y′) ≡ w′ for y ∈ Y s, y′ ∈ Y ns. This is
immediate if r(w, α) ≤ r(w′, β). Suppose r(w, α) > r(w′, β). Optimization by y requires
E[pi(y, w, α)] ≥ E[pi(y, w′, β)]
=⇒ y[r(w, α)− r(w′, β)] ≥ wr(w, α)− w′r(w′, β)
=⇒ y′[r(w, α)− r(w′, β)] > wr(w, α)− w′r(w′, β)
=⇒ E[pi(y′, w, α)] > E[pi(y′, w′, β)]
contradicting optimization by y′ types.
W2 If y ∈ Y s, then ω∗(y) = ω¯∗(y).
Immediate. For any w 6= ω¯∗(y), we have E[pi(y, w, α)] < E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y), α)] < E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y), β)].
The first inequality follows from optimality of ω¯∗(y) given search and the second from the
fact that deterring search raises profits for a given wage. Thus, y types prefer ω¯∗(y) to w.
W3 If y ∈ Y s and y′ ∈ Y ns, then y′ > y.
Suppose y′ < y. By W1, ω∗(y′) ≤ ω∗(y). Because y′ ∈ Y ns and y ∈ Y s, it must be that
ω∗(y′) < ω∗(y). But then, because σ∗(ω∗(y′)) = β by assumption, if search decisions are
monotonically decreasing in w, it must also be that σ∗(ω∗(y)) = β, a contradiction. To
see that search decisions are monotonically decreasing in w, note that in the model in the
text, wages only affect search through beliefs. Thus, because W1 together with Bayes’
rule imply that Eµ[g(y)|w] is increasing in w, it must be that search is decreasing in w.7
7More generally, if we wish to consider an alternative model of poaching, for the claim to hold it is
sufficient to show that the expected gain from searching is weakly decreasing in w given beliefs about g(y).
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W4 Y ns is non-empty.
If Y ns is empty, then ω∗(y) = ω¯∗(y) for all y and wage offers are revealing. But then when
offered ω¯∗(y¯), beliefs are such that Eµ[g(y)|ω¯∗(y¯)] = g(y¯) > g(y∗), so a worker prefers to
not search.
W5 E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))] is continuous in y.
Suppose E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))] is discontinuous at y0 ∈ Y . Then ∃ > 0 such that
for any δ > 0, ∃y′ with |y′−y0| < δ but |E[pi(y′, ω∗(y′), σ∗(ω∗(y′)))]−E[pi(y0, ω∗(y0), σ∗(ω∗(y0)))]| >
. Continuity of E[pi(y, w˜, σ∗(w˜))] for fixed w˜ implies that ∀′ > 0, ∃δ′ > 0 such that if
|y − y0| < δ′, then |E[pi(y, w˜, σ∗(w˜))]− E[pi(y0, w˜, σ∗(w˜))]| < ′. Set ′ =  and δ = δ′ and
let w′ ≡ ω∗(y′) and w0 ≡ ω∗(y0). Then y′ satisfies the preceding and
|E[pi(y′, w˜, σ∗(w˜))]− E[pi(y0, w˜, σ∗(w˜))]| <  < |E[pi(y′, w′, σ∗(w′)]− E[pi(y0, w0, σ∗(w0))]|.
If y′ > y0, then setting w˜ = w′ implies E[pi(y0, w0, σ∗(w0))] < E[pi(y0, w′, σ∗(w′))], so w0 is
not optimal for y0 (since E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))] increases in y). If y′ < y0, then setting
w˜ = w0 implies E[pi(y′, w0, σ∗(w0))] > E[pi(y′, w′, σ∗(w′))], so w′ is not optimal for y′.
W6 Let y, y′ ∈ Y ns. If y < y′ and ω∗(y′) = ω∗(y), then ω∗(y′′) = ω∗(y), ∀y′′ ∈ (y, y′).
Suppose ∃y′′ ∈ (y, y′) such that ω∗(y′′) 6= ω∗(y). Let w ≡ ω∗(y) = ω∗(y′), w′′ ≡ ω∗(y′′)
and y′′ = cy + (1− c)y′ for some c ∈ (0, 1). ω∗(·) is weakly increasing for all types in Y ns
(∂
2E[pi(y,w,β)]/g(y)
∂y∂w
= βhp(w) > 0), so y
′′ ∈ Y s. But then optimality of w for y, y′ implies
cy[r(w, β)− r(w′′, α)] ≥ c[wr(w, β)− w′′r(w′′, α)]
(1− c)y′[r(w, β)− r(w′′, α)] > (1− c)[wr(w, β)− w′′r(w′′, α)].
Adding yields
y′′[r(w, β)− r(w′′, α)] > wr(w, β)− w′′r(w′′, α),
contradicting optimality of w′′ for y′′.
To see this, let V s−ns(w,Eµ[g(y)|w]) denote the expected gain from searching. Then for any w < w′ we have
V s−ns(w,Eµ[g(y)|w]) ≥ V s−ns(w′,Eµ[g(y)|w]) > V s−ns(w′,Eµ[g(y)|w′])
=⇒ V s−ns(w,Eµ[g(y)|w]) > V s−ns(w′,Eµ[g(y)|w′])
where the first inequality follows from the the condition that the expected gain from searching is weakly
decreasing in w for given beliefs, and the second inequality follows from W1 and Bayes’ rule.
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W7 Let y ∈ Y ns. If @ y′ such that ω∗(y′) = ω∗(y), then either |ω∗(y) − ω¯∗(y)| <  for all
 > 0, or y = y¯.
Suppose not. First note that y 6= y, or else the worker infers that y = y < y∗, and hence
searches. But if she searches, it is optimal to offer ω¯∗(y). So consider y ∈ (y, y¯).
Because E[pi(y, w, β)] is single-peaked and continuous in w, if ω∗(y) < ω¯∗(y), then σ∗(ω∗(y)) =
β and @w′ ∈ (ω∗(y), ω¯∗(y)] such that σ∗(w′) = β. Similarly, if ω∗(y) > ω¯∗(y), then
σ∗(ω∗(y)) = β and @w′ ∈ [ω¯∗(y), ω∗(y)) such that σ∗(w′) = β.
Suppose now that ω¯∗(y) − sup{w|w < ω¯∗(y) and σ∗(w) = β} > 0. Then, because
marginal profits of a higher w increase in y for fixed σ and E[pi(y, w, β)] is continuous
in y, there exists a δ > 0 with y − δ > y such that for all y′ ∈ (y − δ, y), we have
ω∗(y′) = max{w|w < ω¯∗(y) and σ∗(w) = β} = ω∗(y), a contradiction of the premise.
Thus, if ω∗(y) < ω¯∗(y), then ω¯∗(y) = sup{w|w < ω¯∗(y) and σ∗(w) = β}. An analogous
argument precludes ω∗(y) > ω¯∗(y) for y < y¯.
W8 If Y s and Y ns are non-empty, then ω∗(y) is discontinuous at sup{Y s}.
Immediate. Fixing the probability that a worker receives an offer, employer profits are
continuous in w, but higher by g(y)(y − w)(α − β)HP (w) if the worker does not search
for a fixed w. The result then follows from optimization in the neighborhood of sup{Y s}.
W9 ∃y′ > inf{Y ns} such that ∀y ∈ Y ns with y ≤ y′, ω∗(y) = wp. Furthermore, y′ ≥
min{y¯,max{y|ω¯∗(y, β) = wp}}.
Suppose there is no y′ ∈ Y ns such that all y ∈ Y ns with y ≤ y′ pool on some wp. If Y s
is non-empty, then inf{ω∗(y)|y ∈ Y ns} < sup{ω∗(y)|y ∈ Y s}, contradicting monotonicity.
If Y s is empty, then ω∗(y) is revealing and induces search, contradicting the premise.
Furthermore, it must be that y′ ≥ min{y¯,max{y|ω¯∗(y, β) = wp}}, or else there will be a
type y′′ > y′ for which ω∗(y′′) > wp ≥ ω¯∗(y′′, β), contradicting optimality of ω∗(y′′) for y′′.
W10 If E[g(y)] < g(y∗), then Y s is non-empty.
From monotonicity of ω∗(y) in y, Eµ[g(y)|ω∗(y)] ≤ E[g(y)]. Thus, Eµ[g(y)|ω∗(y)] < g(y∗),
so the worker prefers to search following ω∗(y).
18
B. Characterization of PSE
Proof.
W1 There is an essentially unique PSE wage strategy ω∗(·). The strategy is characterized
by a unique pooling wage, wp, given by w if Eµ[g(y)|w] > g(y∗), and otherwise solving
Eµ[g(y)|wp] = g(y∗). The pooling region Y p is bounded from below by y if E[pi(y, wp, β)] >
E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)], and otherwise by the y solving E[pi(y, wp, β)] = E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)]. It is
bounded from above by y¯ if y¯ < ω¯∗−1(wp, β), and otherwise by ω¯∗−1(wp, β).
We first establish uniqueness of wp. By W9, at least one pooling wage, wp, exists. Sup-
pose there are multiple, and consider type y˜ pooling on wp
′
> wp with wp
′ 6= ω¯∗(y˜) and
g(y˜) > Eµ[g(y)|wp′ ]. Then w˜ ≡ ω¯∗(y˜) > wp and g(y∗) ≤ Eµ[g(y)|wp] < Eµ[g(y)|wp′ ] <
g(y˜). Note that w˜ is not offered in equilibrium: if it were, then σ∗(w˜) = β, so y˜ should
deviate from wp
′
to w˜.
To show that the credibility condition is violated for w˜, define J(w˜) ≡ {y|E[pi(y, w˜, β)] >
E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))]}. Clearly, y˜ ∈ J(w˜), so J(w˜) is non-empty. Furthermore, for all
y ∈ Y s, E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y), α)] ≥ E[pi(y, wp, β)] > E[pi(y, w˜, β)] from optimization by y ∈ Y s
and single-peakedness, so Y s ∩ J(w˜) = ∅.
In fact, by continuity of profits in y (W5), wp > ω¯∗(inf{y|ω∗(y) = wp}, α) > ω¯∗(inf{y|ω∗(y) =
wp}, β), so sufficiently low types that pool on wp strictly prefer that to deviating to w˜,
regardless of whether w˜ deters search. Therefore Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J(w˜)] > g(y∗), so the worker
should not search following w˜. Thus, the credibility condition fails.
We next establish that wp is given by w if Eµ[g(y)|w] > g(y∗) and otherwise solves
Eµ[g(y)|wp] = g(y∗). Suppose not. Then wp > w and Eµ[g(y)|wp] > g(y∗). To show
that the credibility condition is violated, consider some ˜˜w < wp, and define J ′( ˜˜w) ≡
{y|E[pi(y, ˜˜w, β)] ≥ E[pi(y, ω∗(y), σ∗(ω∗(y)))]}. Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′( ˜˜w)] is weakly increasing and
continuous in ˜˜w. Thus, for any  > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that for all ˜˜w ∈ (wp − δ, wp), we have
Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′(wp)]−Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′( ˜˜w)] < . Set  ≡ Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′(wp)]−g(y∗) and note
that Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′(wp)] = Eµ[g(y)|wp] > g(y∗). Therefore, Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′( ˜˜w)] > g(y∗).
For ˜˜w < wp, the measure of types that strictly prefer ˜˜w to ω∗(y) equals the measure of
types that weakly prefer ˜˜w to ω∗(y), so Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J( ˜˜w)] = Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ J ′( ˜˜w)] > g(y∗),
violating the credibility condition.
Finally, we establish the bounds on Y p(wp). Consider the lower bound, inf{Y p}. If
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E[pi(inf{Y p}, wp, β)] > E[pi(inf{Y p}, ω¯∗(inf{Y p}, α), α)], then either inf{Y p} = y or by
continuity ∃y < inf{Y p} with E[pi(y, wp, β)] > E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)], in which case ω¯∗(y) is
not optimal for y. Conversely, if E[pi(inf{Y p}, wp, β)] < E[pi(inf{Y p}, ω¯∗(inf{Y p}, α), α)],
then by continuity ∃y ∈ Y p with E[pi(y, wp, β)] < E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)]≤ E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), β)],
in which case wp is not optimal for y.
Consider the upper bound, max{Y p}. If max{Y p} < ω¯∗−1(wp, β) then either max{Y p} =
y¯ or W9 is violated. If max{Y p} > ω¯∗−1(wp, β) then, by single-peakedness, all pool-
ing types y > ω¯∗−1(wp, β) prefer ω¯∗(y, β) to wp because σ∗(ω¯∗(y, β)) = β, contradicting
optimality of wp for these types.
When y is sufficiently low (i.e., y < inf{y|E[pi(y, wp, β)] = E[pi(y, ω¯∗(y, α), α)]}) and y¯ is
sufficiently high (i.e., y¯ > ω¯∗−1(wp, β)), then:
W2 Lower types y < inf{Y p} offer low revealing (complete-information) wages that induce
workers to search.
All low types y < inf{Y p} induce search (W3) and all such types set ω¯∗(y, α) < wp (W2).
W3 Type y = inf{Y p} is indifferent between setting wp and the discontinuously lower
complete-information wage that induces search.
The claim follows immediately from W1 and the sufficient support restriction.
W4 Types y ∈ Y p pool on a wage wp just high enough to deter search, i.e., Eµ[g(y)|wp] =
g(y∗).
Eµ[g(y)|y ∈ Y p(wp)] is monotone increasing in wp, so wp > w uniquely solves Eµ[g(y)|wp] =
g(y∗) provided Eµ[g(y)|w] < g(y∗). But if Eµ[g(y)|w] ≥ g(y∗), then inf{Y p} = y, a con-
tradiction.
W5 Higher types y > max{Y p} offer high revealing (complete-information) wages that
strictly discourage search.
All high types y > max{Y p} discourage search (W3). All such types who don’t pool set
ω¯∗(y, β) by single-peakedness, as no other type prefers ω¯∗(y, β), and so σ∗(ω¯∗(y, β)) = β.
W6 wp is the complete-information wage of the highest pooling type.
The claim follows immediately from W1 and the sufficient support restriction.
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C. Alternative models of wage competition
Our main qualitative characterizations extend to various alternative models of wage compe-
tition. To see this, note that if the incumbent is committed to its initial offer, the following
conditions are sufficient for the proofs of Propositions 1-3 to hold:
1. The expected gain from searching is weakly decreasing in w, given beliefs.
2. The benefit of a higher wage is greater for higher types.
3. Expected profits are single-peaked in w.
Thus, to determine whether our qualitative results generalize for any particular alternative
model of wage competition, it suffices to verify that these conditions hold.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which successful search allows the worker to draw a
wage w′ from some exogenous distribution HP . Such a scenario would arise, for example,
if the raiding firm could not observe the incumbent’s offer, or if the current job has some
non-pecuniary value that the worker cannot credibly reveal to the raiding firm. To see that
Condition 1 is satisfied, first note that the expected payoff from successful search is given by
E[max{x,w′}] where w′ ∼ HP and x ∈ {b, w} are constants. Then, the expected gain from
searching with wage offer w in hand may be written as
(α− β)
[(
1− Eµ[g(y)|w]
)[
E[max{b, w′}]− b]+ Eµ[g(y)|w][E[max{w,w′}]− w]]− κ.
For fixed beliefs Eµ[g(y)|w], the expected gain from searching with wage offer w in hand is
thus weakly decreasing in w so long as ∂E[max{w,w
′}]
∂w
= HP (w) ≤ 1. Condition 1 is therefore
satisfied. To see that Conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied, simply note that, for fixed σ, the
firm’s expected profit function is unchanged: E[pi(y, w, σ)] = g(y)(y−w)[1− σ(1−HP (w))].
Condition 2 then follows immediately from the cross-partial: ∂
2E[pi(y,w,σ)]/g(y)
∂y∂w
= σhp(w) > 0.
Condition 3 likewise follows immediately from strict concavity of expected profits in w.
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